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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 3834

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, CSCE

SUBJECT: ANNEX TO PUBLIC OPINION GUIDANCE PAPER

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

REF: A. USNATO 3723

B. STATE 165698

1. AT JULY 15 MEETING, CSCE PUBLIC RELATIONS WORKING GROUP
APPROVED TEXT AS TRANSMITTED REF A WITH ONLY MINOR GRAMMATICAL/
EDITORIAL CHANGES. PAPER IS THUS COMPLETE WITH EXCEPTION OF
LANGUAGE ON CSCE FOLLOW-UP WHICH WG HAS DEVELOPED AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT OF FOLLOW-UP LANGUAGE:

BASKET IV: FOLLOW-UP

20. THE RESULT UNDER THIS ITEM REFLECTS THE WISHES OF
THE ALLIED COUNTRIES TO GUARANTEE THAT THE DECISIONS TAKEN AT
THE CONFERENCE ARE TRANSLATED INTO REALITY, AND THAT THE "FOLLOW-
UP" SHOULD BE PRACTICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE HAVING REGARD TO
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECISIONS ALREADY TAKEN. THUS THE
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DECLARATION ON FOLLOW-UP" STRESSES THE RESOLUTION OF THE
PARTIES TO GIVE PRACTICAL EFFECT TO THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE,
UNILATERALLY, BILATERALLY AND MULTILATERALLY. MOREOVER, IT
PROVIDES FOR THE HOLDING OF MEETINGS OF REPRESENTATIVES

DESIGNATED BY FOREIGN MINISTERS, THE FIRST IN 1977, TO CONSIDER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONFERENCE DECISIONS AND PROGRESS, IN THIS CONTEXT, IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS, SECURITY AND DETENTE.

21. THE COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE ALWAYS OPPOSED THE CREATION AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE OF A PERMANENT ORGAN WITH A GENERAL MANDATE TO SUPERVISE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL DECISIONS BEFORE SUCH IMPLEMENTATION HAS BEGUN.
END TEXT OF FOLLOW-UP LANGUAGE

2. WORKING GROUP ALSO DISCUSSED A UK PAPER PROVIDING SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO POSSIBLE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CSCE RESULTS. UK PAPER (TEXT BELOW) WAS ACCEPTED AS USEFUL NATIONAL CONTRIBUTION ON BASIS THAT IT DOES NOT REFLECT AGREED ALLIANCE APPROACH TO EACH OF THE QUESTIONS RAISED. WG BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT PAPER WOULD BE USEFUL ADDITION TO "PRESS KIT" OF ALLIED SPOKESMAN DEALING WITH THE CSCE.

3. SPC CHAIRMAN KASTL HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE SPC APPROVE BOTH THE CSCE/PR ANNEX PAPER AND THE ABOVE HANDLING OF THE UK CONTRIBUTION. APPROVAL WOULD BE BY SILENCE PROCEDURE UNLESS OBJECTIONS ARE RAISED BY NOON, JULY 22. SHOULD NO OBJECTIONS BE RAISED. ANNEX PAPER AND HANDLING OF UK SUBMISSION WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO COUNCIL FOR NOTING AT JULY 23 MEETING.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT CONCURRENCE IN METHOD OF SPC AND NAC APPROVAL SUGGESTED BY KASTL AS ABOVE. FOLLOWING NAC APPROVAL, MISSION PROPOSES TO CIRCULATE BOTH TEXTS TO ADDRESSEES OF USNATO 3792 FOR USE IN ASSOCIATION WITH BASIC SPC TEXT ON PUBLIC INFORMATION ASPECTS OF THE CSCE.

5. BEGIN TEXT OF UK PAPER:

UNITED KINGDOM PAPER
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE CSCE
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1. WHAT MAJOR GAINS AT THE CONFERENCE WERE ACHIEVED BY THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO BALANCE THE SOVIET CLAIM OF ENDORSEMENT OF THE STATUS QUO IN EUROPE?

THE CONFERENCE WILL NOT ENDORSE THE TERRITORIAL STATUS QUO IN EUROPE. ITS DECISIONS WILL BE OF A POLITICAL NATURE AND WILL NOT HAVE LEGAL FORCE. IT WILL RECOGNIZE THAT, WHILE EXISTING FRONTIERS IN EUROPE ARE INVIOABLE, THEY CAN BE CHANGES- IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW- BY PEACEFUL MEANS OR BY AGREEMENT.

WESTERN VIEWS HAVE BEEN WELL REFLECTED IN ALL THE DOCUMENTS DRAWNUP AT THE CONFERENCE, INCLUDING THE DECLARATION

OF PRINCIPLES, WHICH FOR INSTANCE CONTAINS GOOD TEXTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, AND WHICH RECOGNIZES SPECIFICALLY THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN STATES. BUT THE WEST'S DYNAMIC VIEW OF EUROPE WAS REFLECTED IN A LARGE NUMBER OF PROPOSALS FOR PRACTICAL MEASURES TO IMPROVE RELATIONS IN EUROPE. SATISFACTORY TEXTS HAVE NOW BEEN DRAWN UP AND INCLUDE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES, AND A VARIETY OF TEXTS PROVIDING FOR THE FREER CIRCULATION OF PEOPLE INFORMATION AND IDEAS THROUGHOUT EUROPE. THERE ARE ALSO A WIDE RANGE OF TEXTS PROVIDING FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN EDUCATION, CULTURAL AND COMMERCIAL CONTACTS WHICH SHOULD BENEFIT WESTERN SPECIALISTS AND REPRESENTATIVES IN THE MANY FIELDS CONCERNED. PROVIDED ALL THE PARTICIPANTS TRANSLATE THESE PROMISES INTO PRACTICE ONCE THE CONFERENCE IS OVER, THE SITUATION IN EUROPE AS IT AFFECTS THE INDIVIDUAL CITIZEN WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED.

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2. WHAT ADVANCES MAY BE ACHIEVED IN OTHER EAST/WEST NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE APPROXIMATE PARALLELISM WHICH THE WEST APPEARED TO PRESCRIBE AT AN EARLIER STAGE?

THE DECISIONS OF THE CSCE SHOULD, ONCE THEY ARE PUT INTO PRACTICE, BE OF REAL BENEFIT TO THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE AS A WHOLE IN THEIR EVERYDAY LIVES. THE WEST HAS THEREFORE AT NO STAGE SOUGHT TO MAKE PROGRESS AT THE CSCE CONDITIONAL ON EQUIVALENT PROGRESS AT OTHER NEGOTIATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE WILL BE JUDGED NOT ONLY BY THE WAY IN WHICH THE DECISIONS OF THE CSCE ARE PUT INTO EFFECT, BUT ALSO BY THE WILLINGNESS SHOWN BY THE

SOVIET UNION AND HER ALLIES TO MAKE SIMILAR PROGRESS IN
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE MILITARY FIELD, IN PARTICULAR THOSE ON
THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AT VIENNA.

3. WAS CONSULTATION WITHIN NATO SUCCESSFUL IN
STRENGTHENING OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION OR DID IT
LEAD ULTIMATELY TO A LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR
ATTITUDE, FOR INSTANCE ON PARALLELISM?

ADVANCE ALLIED CONSULTATION SUCCEEDED IN DEVELOPING A
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COMMON ALLIANCE APPROACH TOWARDS THE CONFERENCE AND LED TO
THE TABLING OF A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS WHICH WERE ADOPTED BY THE
CONFERENCE. ALSO THROUGHOUT THE TWO YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS AT THE
CSCE, CO-ORDINATION AMONG THE COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN
CLOSE AND CONSTANT. THIS HAD HAD A MAJOR EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, AND HAS UNDERLINED THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ALLIANCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DETENTE. BY
STANDING FIRMLY AND PATIENTLY ON MAJOR POINTS OF PRINCIPLE
WHILE ADVANCING THE NEGOTIATIONS WHENEVER POSSIBLE IN A SPIRIT
OF CONSTRUCTIVE COMPROMISE, THE COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE
BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE BALANCED RESULTS WHICH CORRESPOND FULLY TO
WESTERN OBJECTIVES IN THE PURSUIT OF DETENTE.

4. WHAT WILL THE WESTERN ATTITUDE BE IF EASTERN
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS REACH IN
BASKET III IS RESTRICTIVE?

IT IS TRUE THAT, UNTIL A FAIRLY LATE STAGE IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIET UNION AND HER ALLIES WERE ANXIOUS TO
WORK RESTRICTIVE FORMULATION INTO THE TEXTS, PARTICULARLY IN
BASKET III. HOWEVER, THE TEXTS NOW CONTAIN CLEAR COMMITMENTS
TO TAKE ACTION ALONG PARTICULAR LINES, AND THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

THUS SEEM TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE WESTERN VIEW THAT, IF DETENTE IS
TO ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC OPINION, IT MUST BE SEEN TO HOLD
TANGIBLE BENEFITS FOR ORDINARY PEOPLE. ALL THE PARTICIPANTS AT
THE CONFERENCE HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO ENSURE THAT ITS DECISIONS ARE
FULLY PUT INTO EFFECT. THE COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE WILL HONOUR
THIS COMMITMENT, AND EXPECT ALL OTHER PARTICIPANTS TO DO THE
SAME. THE FUTURE OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS AND ANY AGREEMENT

TO HOLD FUTURE MEETINGS OF THE PRESENT KIND WILL DEPEND UPON HOW
FULLY THE DECISIONS OF THIS CONFERENCE HAVE BEEN PUT INTO EFFECT.

5. HOW DOES THE CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE SQUARE WITH
EVENTS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD AND THE SPREAD OF
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE?

ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES TO BE ENUNCIATED AT HELSINKI
COMMIT STATES IN DETAIL AGAINST ANY TYPE OF INTERFERENCE IN

EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL
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AFFAIRS. IT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE CONFERENCE, AND WOULD JEOPARDISE THE PROSPECTS FOR DETENTE TO WHICH THE SOVIET LEADERS ATTACH SUCH IMPORTANCE, IF THIS PRINCIPLE WERE NOT ACTED UPON IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES, IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, SOCIAL OR ECONOMIC SYSTEMS. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WILL FOLLOW THE SCSCE, MODIFY THEIR DOCTRINE OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, WHICH CALLS FOR CO-OPERATION BETWEEN STATES, ACCOMPANIED HOWEVER, BY UNREMITTING STRUGGLE AT THE IDEOLOGICAL LEVEL LEADING TO THE ULTIMATE ELIMINATION OF CAPITALISM. THIS DOCTRINE WILL BE DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE WITH THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN AT THE CSCE. THE ALLIANCE AND OTHER COUNTRIES WILL BE WATCHING CLOSELY TO SEE HOW FAR THE SOVIET PERFORMANCE IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE MEASURES UP TO THEIR COMMITMENTS AT THE CONFERENCE.

6. WHAT NEW INITIATIVES ARE BEING CONSIDERED BY THE WEST AND SPECIFICALLY IN NATO IN ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE OR FURTHER PURSUE THE DETENTE PROCESS, ASSUMING THAT CSCE FOLLOW-UP REMAINS ROUGHTLY ON COURSE?

THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IS NOT YET FIRMLY ESTABLISHED, AND IT WILL BE IMPORTANT NOT TO OVERLOAD IT IN THE EARLY STAGES. THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE CSCE WILL REQUIRE ACTION BY THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A LARGE NUMBER OF DIFFERENT FIELDS, OFTEN UNILATERALLY BY THE PARTICIPATING STATES ON THEIR INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT, BUT ALSO IN SOME CASES BILATERALLY OR MULTILATERALLY. THE EMPHASIS IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF WHAT HAS SO FAR BEEN AGREED. PARTICIPANTS AT THE CONFERENCE HAVE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN IN ABOUT TWO YEARS TO ASSESS IMPLEMENTATION AND CONSIDER PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER ACTION. THIS MEANS THAT ALL CONCERNED ACCEPT THAT THE NEXT TWO YEARS SHOULD BE USED IMPLEMENT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE. THE ALLIANCE WILL, FOR INSTANCE, TAKE ITS PART IN ENSURING THAT THESE CONCLUSIONS ARE FULLY IMPLEMENTED IN THE MILITARY FIELD. IN THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE CONFERENCE THERE WILL ALSO BE A NEED TO MATCH THE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE IN THE POLITICAL FIELD WITH EQUIVALENT PROGRESS IN THE MILITARY FIELD, IN PARTICULAR AT THE TALKS ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AT VIENNA.

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7. ARE WE NOT RUNNING THE RISK THROUGH BASKET III OF DESTABILIZING THE SITUATION IN EUROPE BY ADDING TO THE SENSE OF INSECURITY IN THE EAST AND WAS NOT THE WEST'S POSITION ON THIS MORE IDEOLOGICAL IN TONE THAN

ANYTHING SOUGHT BY THE SOVIETS?
IT IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE WESTERN APPROACH TO DETENTE
THAT, IF THE PROCESS IS TO HAVE ANY MEANING AND BE ACCEPTABLE TO
WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION, IT MUST YIELD CONCRETE BENEFIT TO
INDIVIDUALS, BOTH PERSONALLY AND IN THEIR PROFESSIONAL LIVES.
BASKET III IS CONCERNED WITH THE NEED TO BUILD MORE SECURE, FRUIT-
FUL AND CO-OPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS THROUGHOUT EUROPE, IN FIELDS
FROM WHICH INDIVIDUALS, THROUGH GREATER FREEDOM, CAN DRAW DIRECT
BENEFIT. THE TEXTS WHICH HAVE BEEN DRAWN UP OFFER A GOOD
BASIS FOR PRACTICAL IMPROVEMENTS IN A VARIETY OF IMPORTANT
FIELDS. THEY ARE DESIGNED TO PUT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AND THEIR INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS
ON A BASIS OF TRUST RATHER THAN SUSPICION, AND OF KNOWLEDGE
RATHER THAN IGNORANCE. BUT THEY ARE VERY LIMITED IN SCOPE,
AND CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO LEAD TO MORE THAN GRADUAL CHANGE.
THE RISK IS THAT THE PACE WILL BE TOO SLOW, RATHER THAN
THAT THE SITUATION IN EUROPE WILL BE DESTABILIZED.

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8. THE SOVIET UNION CLAIMS THAT THE CSCE IS A TRIUMPH
FOR ITS POLICY OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE". WHAT IS
THE WESTERN VIEW OF THIS CLAIM?

THE DOCTRINE OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" IS AIMED AT
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN ITS DEFINITION IS THAT CO-
OPERATION SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY UNREMITTING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC
AND IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE SHORT OF MILITARY CONFLICT. THIS IS
NOT A CONCEPT WHICH WE CAN OR WILL ACCEPT. THE CONCLUSIONS OF
THESE NOWHERE REFLECT THE IDEA THAT IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE
IS AN INEVITABLE OR NECESSARY ELEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN
STATES. THEY EMPHASISE RATHER THAN NEED FOR CO-OPERATION AMONG
STATES AND INDIVIDUALS IN ALL FIELDS AND ARE BASED UPON IDEAS

OF IDEOLOGICAL TOLERANCE OF WHICH A MAJOR ELEMENT IS THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE, INFORMATION AND IDEAS. THE CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS THUS EXPRESS A VIEW OF RELATIONS WITHIN EUROPE WHICH RUNS DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE ELEMENTS IN THE DOCTRINE OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" TO WHICH THE SOVIET IDEOLOGISTS ATTACH MOST IMPORTANCE. AND THE FACT THAT THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND THE PRACTICAL MEASURES OF CO-OPERATION HAVE EQUAL STATUS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE QUALITY OF EUROPEAN RELATIONS WILL BE JUDGED IN FUTURE NOT SIMPLY IN TERMS OF ABSTRACT IDEAS BUT IN TERMS OF THE PRACTICAL

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IMPLICATION OF MEASURES OF DAY TO DAY CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL TRUST.

9. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE AT THE CSCE TO UNDERMINE THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE OF LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY?

THE CONFERENCE HAS BEEN CONCERNED WITH MATERS OF MORE IMPORTANCE THAN THE UNDERMINING OF SO-CALLED DOCTRINES WHICH ENJOY NO VALIDITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. NEVERTHELESS, ALL THE PARTICIPANTS WILL UNDERTAKE AT HELSINKI TO RESPECT EACH OTHER'S SOVEREIGN EQUALITY. THIS CONCEPT IS DEFINED IN THE FIRST OF THE TEN PRINCIPLES IN TERMS WHICH EXCLUDE ANY ATTEMPT TO LIMIT THE SOVEREIGNTY OF ANY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATE, WHICH SET THE CONDUCT OF INTER-STATE RELATIONS FIRMLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND WHICH MAKE NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN STATES OF SIMILAR OR DIFFERENT ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS.

10. HAS THE CONFERENCE PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIET UNION'S ALLIES TO LOOSEN THAT COUNTRY'S GRIP ON THEIR AFFAIRS?

THE CONFERENCE HAS BEEN CONDUCTED ON THE BASIS OF CONSENSUS. THIS MEANS THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO NEED FOR ANY PARTICIPANT TO ACCEPT A VIEW PUT FORWARD BY ANY OTHER PARTICIPANT WITH WHICH HE DISAGREES, AND THAT ALL COUNTRIES HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE PART ON AN ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT BASIS.

THERE HAVE BEEN OCCASIONS AT THE CSCE WHEN SOME AT LEAST OF THE SOVIET UNION'S ALLIES HAVE PUBLICLY DISAGREED WITH THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW AND WE EXPECT THAT THIS PROCESS WILL CONTINUE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONFERENCE. IT IS NOT WITHOUT IMPORTANCE THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENSUS IS ONE WHICH THE ROMANIANS AND OTHERS ARE TRYING TO ESTABLISH-AGAINST SOVIET OPPOSITION-IN MEETINGS WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.

11. WHAT WILL THE CONFERENCE HAVE DONE TO IMPROVE THE

SECURITY OF THE WEST?
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THE CONFERENCE HAS NOT BEEN CONCERNED WITH FINDING SOLUTIONS TO THE MAJOR PROBLEMS OF MILITARY SECURITY IN EUROPE. THAT IS THE TASK OF NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS THOSE BEING HELD IN VIENNA ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES. HOWEVER, THE CONFERENCE HAS RECOGNIZED THAT SECURITY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN A PURELY POLITICAL FRAMEWORK. ITS MILITARY ASPECTS HAVE BEEN REFLECTED, TO SOME EXTENT, IN VARIOUS MEASURES DESIGNED TO IMPROVE POLITICAL CONFIDENCE AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES THROUGH STEPS TAKEN IN THE MILITARY FIELD. THESE MEASURES INCLUDE THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES, AND THE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MANOEUVRES. THEY WILL NOT, IN THEMSELVES, IMPROVE MILITARY SECURITY IN ANY PART OF EUROPE. BUT IF THEY ARE ACTED ON THEY SHLD MARK A MODEST BEGINNING IN TACKLING THE CAUSES OF MILITARY TENSION IN EUROPE, AND HELP TO PROVIDE THE RIGHT POLITICAL CLIMATE FOR PROGRESS AT OTHER NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS THOSE IN VIENNA.

12. THE WEST WANTED TO AVOID MERE DECLARATIONS. HOW MANY FIRM DECISIONS HAVE IN FACT BEEN TAKEN?

ONE OF THE DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE WILL BE A DECLARATION OF POLITICAL PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE TO APPLY IN FUTURE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES. THE DECLARATION IS AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL DOCUMENT. AMONG OTHER MATTERS, IT REFERS TO THE INVIOATILITY OF FRONTIERS AND TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL CHANGES; TO THE NEED TO AVOID INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES; TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS; AND TO THE ROLE OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES. IN THESE AND OTHER RESPECTS, THE DECLARATION REFLECTS THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW. HOWEVER, IT IS ONLY ONE PART OF THE FINAL CONFERENCE DOCUMENT. THE MEETING IN HELSINKI WILL COMMIT GOVERNMENTS TO IMPLEMENT THE CONCLUSIONS OVER A WIDE-RANGING FIELD. ARRANGEMENT HAVE, FOR INSTANCE, BEEN DRAWN UP FOR THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES, AND FOR THE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MANOEUVRES. THERE ARE A LARGE NUMBER OF TEXTS REFLECTING INTENTIONS TO IMPROVE CONTACTS AND CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF TRADE, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY. AND IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION AND HUMAN
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CONTACTS, THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE DECIDED TO INCREASE THE AVAILABILITY OF BROADCAST, PRINTED AND OTHER TYPES OF INFORMATION BETWEEN AND WITHIN THEIR COUNTRIES; TO MAKE SURE THAT JOURNALISTS ARE ABLE TO PURSUE THEIR LEGITIMATE PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY WITHOUT INTERFERENCE; AND TO ALLOW FREER TRAVEL BY

THEIR CITIZENS WHETHER FOR PROFESSIONAL OR PERSONAL REASONS, INCLUDING FOR INSTANCE WHEN THEY WISH TO MARRY OR TO BE REUNITED WITH MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES. THE TEXTS ALSO PROVIDE FOR AN INTENSIFICATION OF CONTACTS AND CO-OPERATION IN MATTERS OF CULTURE AND EDUCATION.

PARTICIPANTS HAVE ACCEPTED A MORAL AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH ARE NOT LEGALLY BINDING. NATURALLY IN A CONFERENCE OF THIS KIND THE LEVEL OF COMMITMENT FOR EACH PEICE OF ACTION HAS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE COMPETENCE AND PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE GOVERNMENTS WHO ARE TO EXPRESS THEIR CONSENSUS. BUT WE BELIEVE THAT IT WILL IN PRACTICE BE EMBARRASSING FOR STATES NOT TO GIVE DECENT EFFECT TO THE PROMISES OF ACTION WHICH THEY WILL MAKE AT GENEVA.

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13. HAVE THE RUSSIANS NOT BROUGHT PSYCHOLOGICAL DISARMAMENT A BIG STEP CLOSER BY MEANS OF THE CSCE?

NO, PROVIDED THAT THE NATURE OF THE CONFERENCE IS PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD. THE REAL SOURCES OF MILITARY TENSION IN EUROPE ARE BEING TACKLED NOT AT THE CSCE BUT AT NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS THOSE IN VIENNA ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS. IT WILL CERTAINLY BE NECESSARY, AFTER THE CONFERENCE IS OVER, TO MAKE EARLY PROGRESS IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS IF THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IS TO STAY IN BALANCE.

CERTAIN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES APPLICABLE IN THE MILITARY FIELD HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATED AT THE CSCE, INCLUDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES. THESE WILL HAVE NO MILITARY EFFECT. THEY ARE

INTENDED ONLY AS A MODEST FIRST STEP ALONG THE ROAD TOWARDS IMPROVING POLITICAL CONFIDENCE AND REDUCING MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE MILITARY INTENTIONS OF OTHER STATES. BUT PROVIDED THEY ARE FULLY IMPLEMENTED, THEY SHOULD BE OF USE IN THIS LIMITED SENSE, AND HELPTO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS THOSE IN VIENNA.

IT WOULD BE WRONG TO SUPPOSE THAT THE CSCE WILL IN
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ITSELF HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE SITUATION IN EUROPE. ALL THAT CAN BE SAID IS THAT IF ITS DECISIONS ARE FULLY IMPLEMENTED BY ALL THE PARTICIPANTS, AND IF PROGRESS IS MADE IN REDCING THE DANGEROUS LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS AND FORCES CONFRONTING EACH OTHER IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THEN DETENTE WILL HAVE PROVED ITS WORTH AS A POLICY WHICH CAN BRING CONCRETE BENEFIT TO ORDINARY PEOPLE.

14. THE RUSSIANS SEE THE CSCE AS A STEP TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A "SYSTEM OF PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY". THE WEST SEEMS TO OPPOSE THIS CONCEPT. WHY?

CALLS BY THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SYSTEMS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY OWE MORE TO PROPAGANDA THAN TO ANY GENUINE DESIRE TO MAKE EUROPE MORE SECURE. THE RUSSIANS HAVE OFTEN MADE IT CLEAR THAT, IN THEIR VIEW, A SYSTEM OF PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY WOULD INVOLVE THE DISMANTLEMENT OF NATO AND OF THE WARSAW PACT. IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW THEY RECONCILE THE PROPOSALS WITH THE SUBSTANTIAL GROWTH, YEAR BY YEAR, IN THEIR MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND IN THE FORCES DEPLOYED OFFENSIVELY BY THE WARSAW PACT. IN ANY CASE A DISMANTLING OF THE WARSAW PACT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY WEAKEN SOVIET MILITARY SUPREMACY IN EASTERN EUROPE. MOREOVER, THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE CSCE DO NOT AFFECT THE EXISTING NETWORK OF BILATERAL TREATIES WHICH BIND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE KIND OF SECURITY SYSTEM WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAVE IN MIND WOULD EVIDENTLY BE STRICTLY ON SOVIET TERMS. THIS UNDERLINES A CONTINUING NEED FOR THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE TO ENSURE THE COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE OF WESTERN EUROPE.
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